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Abstract 
A number of studies have indicated that Self-Affirmation (SA) manipulation plays a role 
in decreasing an attention bias toward threatening information, especially when there is 
a threat to the self. Despite this, to date no studies have investigated if SA can mitigate 
the attention bias toward socially threatening stimuli that is exhibited in individuals high 
in social anxiety. The aim of the current study is to explore the possible moderating 
effects of SA manipulation on the attention bias in individuals with high social anxiety. 
150 participants completed the study, 8 of which were excluded based upon poor 
accuracy on the emotional Stroop task. This left a sample of data from 142 participants 
(aged 18-71 years, M=26.66, SD=l0.94). Participants were required to complete a 
number of measures online, including the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
(Leary,1983) and the Beck Depression Inventory- 2nd edition (Beck, Steer & Brown, 
1996) as well as undergo a SA manipulation or control condition similar to that used in 
previous SA studies (Armitage, Harris and Arden, 2011). The independent variables 
were social anxiety group (high, low) and experimental condition (SA manipulation, 
control). The dependent variable was emotional interference score as identified by 
latency times to identify print colour for social threat and control words presented in an 
emotional Stroop task. A 2 by 2 (Social anxiety: high, low; experimental condition: SA, 
control; covariate: depression score) ANCOV A was run on the data and revealed no 
significant main effects for social anxiety group or experimental condition (p>.05). The 
social anxiety group x experimental condition interaction was also not significant 
(p>.05). Unfortunately, the aim of the study could not be tested due to no significant 
differences in emotional interference scores between those high and low in social 
anxiety. This raises questions about the presence of an attention bias toward socially 
threatening words by individuals high in social anxiety in an online environment. 
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Attentional Bias in Anxiety 
Attention processes are believed to be an important causal and maintaining 
factor in anxiety (Bagels & Mansell, 2004 ). Evidence suggests that people with high 
levels of anxiety exhibit an attentional bias toward threatening information consistent 
with their concerns; an effect that is not evident in individuals low in anxiety. The 
attention bias in anxiety has been studied widely using a number of different paradigms 
and has been exhibited for individuals high in both state and trait anxiety (Mogg, 
Bradley, De Bono and Painter, 1997). 
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It is proposed that this bias plays a pivotal role in the maintenance of the 
individual's anxiety, by making the likelihood of detecting threats more probable which 
in turn leads to a more anxious mood state (Matthews, 1990). At what stage of 
processing this attentional bias occurs, however is still a topic of contention. Whilst 
some cognitive theories such as schema theories explain this attention bias as occurring 
as a result of the cognitive processing of anxious individuals being guided by schemas 
biased toward threat which leads to threatening information being favoured at all stages 
of processing, more recent theories take a different view (Bagels & Mansell, 2004 ). One 
proposal is that anxious people first direct their attention toward the threat early in 
processing ( and leading to a more anxious state) but that this is followed by a time of 
directing their attention away from the threat (that reduces the anxiety by avoiding the 
threat; Mogg, Braddely, De Bono & Painter, 1997). Others propose that the attentional 
bias is due to the anxious individual having difficulty disengaging from the threat, rather 
than increasing the likelihood of the detection of the threat (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenberg & van IJsendoom, 2007). It is likely that a number of 
moderating factors play a role in the attentional bias in anxiety and it is probable that 
where this bias occurs and the role it plays is largely dependent on the type of anxiety 
being studied. However, this is outside of the scope of this study. 
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A meta-analysis of 172 studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) found that this attention 
bias was prevalent across a number of different groups of anxious individuals including 
those with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Generalised Anxiety Disorder, Panic 
Disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, Simple and Social Phobia as well as those 
with subclinical levels of anxiety. Furthermore, it was found that overall; this effect 
occurred across a number of different experimental paradigms and occurred 
independently of the existence of mood disorders. This attention bias was demonstrated 
at comparable levels across all groups tested and consistently did not occur in those low 
in anxiety. 
Social Anxiety and Attention Bias 
This attention bias toward threatening information has also been evidenced in 
individuals with social phobia and social anxiety. Central to both social phobia and 
social anxiety is a fear of negative evaluation and attentional biases are purported to 
occur in relation to stimuli associated with negative evaluation or when there is an 
expectation that one will be judged in a negative manner (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). 
Using the Stroop colour naming task, Hope, Rapee, Heimberg and Dombeck 
(1990), found that social phobics showed more effortful processing (as indicated by 
longer latency times) of words related to self-schemata and self-evaluation but not of 
unrelated threat words or neutral words. The finding that individuals with social phobia 
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show an attention bias toward fear-congruent stimuli has been replicated in a number of 
other studies using the emotional Stroop task (Andersson, Westoo, Johansson & 
Carlbring, 2006), and modified dot-probe task using words (Musa, Lepine, 
Clark,Mansell, and Ehlers, 2003) and faces (Mogg & Bradley, 2002). 
This attention bias has also been demonstrated in individuals with subclinical 
levels of social anxiety both in terms of hypervigilance and avoidance of threatening 
stimuli. For example, Mogg & Bradley (2002) found that individuals high in social 
anxiety show an attention bias toward threatening stimuli in comparison to individuals 
with low social anxiety. However; Mansell, Clark, Ehlers and Chen (1999) found that 
individuals high in fear of negative evaluation showed an avoidance response to external 
threatening stimuli when placed under social-evaluative threat conditions on a probe 
detection task. The finding of either a vigilance or avoidance response to threatening 
stimuli has been replicated in a number of other studies using individuals with high 
levels of social anxiety (Vigilance : Perowne and Mansell, 2002; Ononaiye, Turpin & 
Reidy, 2007; Avoidance: Mansell, Clark & Ehlers, 2003). 
One way of explaining the mixed findings in research on the attention bias in 
social anxiety is through the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (Mogg et al., 1997). 
According to this hypothesis, individuals high in social anxiety exhibit enhanced 
processing of threatening stimuli ( also known as hypervigilance) related to a social 
threat (such as fear of negative evaluation) followed by an avoidance response due to the 
their inability to reappraise the stimulus as being non-threatening. That is, they display a 
defensive bias away from the threatening stimuli. According to cognitive models of 
social anxiety and social phobia, it is this response that may play a causal and 
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maintaining role in social anxiety and social fears. It does this by causing individuals 
with social anxiety to first scan the environment for threatening information ( such as 
negative evaluation or perceived signs of it) which heightens the anxiety state (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) and then the defensive bias or avoidance response prevents re-
appraisal of the situation as non-threatening and reduces anxiety which in the long term 
maintains the response (Clark and Wells, 1995).Studies have indicated that stimuli 
linked to negative self-perception, self-critical thoughts and negative self- appraisals 
appear to produce this hypervigilance-avoidance response in individuals with Social 
Phobia (Hope et al., 1990) and high levels of social anxiety (Vassilopoulos, 2005; 
Ononaiye, Turpin & Reidy, 2007), thus suggesting that being socially anxious has 
substantial implications in terms of the individuals self schemata. 
A study by Vassilopoulos (2005) also aimed to explain these mixed findings by 
investigating the time course of the attentional bias in individuals high in social anxiety 
by using a probe detection task. It was found that individuals high in social anxiety 
demonstrated an initial hypervigilance response toward both physical and social threat 
words followed by avoidance of the threatening stimuli. Those low in social anxiety did 
not show this effect. This effect remained after controlling for levels of general anxiety 
and depression. This indicates that the previous mixed findings reported here may have 
occurred because of the exposure time of the stimulus rather than being indicative of 
either a hypervigilance or avoidant response in that hypervigilance occurs at shorter 
durations and avoidance at longer durations. It has also been suggested that 
hypervigilance may occur when the individual is unsure if social threat is present and 
that this occurs almost immediately, and that the avoidance response occurs as a 
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defensive mechanism when the individual feels that they are being negatively evaluated 
and may take longer to develop (Bo gels & Mansell, 2004 ). 
Some further research in the area of attention bias and social anxiety has 
indicated that the presence of a social threat or expectation of being evaluated may 
moderate the attention bias in a number of ways. A study by Ononaiye, Turpin and 
Reidy (2007) indicated that individuals high in social anxiety showed an attention bias 
toward social threat words when no social threat was present but exhibited an attention 
bias toward physical threat words related to the physiological anxiety response when a 
social threat was present (the expectation of giving a speech). Furthermore, there is 
some research that suggests that when the threat of social evaluation is absent, no 
attention bias toward threatening information is evident (Mansell et al., 1999; Mansell et 
al., 2003). This suggests that the expectation of being negatively evaluated and the state 
anxiety that accompanies this fear may be a moderating factor in the presence of the 
attention bias toward threatening stimuli. 
Self-Affirmation and Defensive Bias 
One area of research that has focused on reducing defensive bias (in the domains 
of both social and health psychology) in response to threats to the self is Self-
Affirmation (SA) theory (Harris & Napper, 2005). Although SA theory has been used 
primarily in research exploring biased information processing, it has also been used in 
the research of cognitive dissonance, causal attributions, prejudice and stereotyping, 
stress and rumination (Sherman and Cohen, 2006), which suggests that it might also be 
applied to the study of attentional bias in social anxiety. 
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SA theory developed from the realisation that people face numerous threats to 
the self and the possibility of failure in their day to day lives and is based upon the 
premise that in the face of these threats, one is motivated to maintain their self integrity 
and worth. According to SA theory, integrity refers to a feeling that one is a good and 
appropriate person in terms of meeting the norms and standards that are set out for them 
within their cultural or social group (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Consequently, these 
standards vary across cultures, situations and specific group identification. 
Integrity can be threatened, however as the self is made up of a number of 
domains including individual roles ( e.g. as a parent), values (such as being a good 
friend), belief systems ( e.g. being a Christian), social identities (membership to a 
particular group) and people's goals (e,g, being good at school). So when any 
information is encountered that indicates that someone is not meeting the standards set 
out by themselves, their culture or social group in one of these domains, that person's 
self- integrity is threatened. For example, the ability to be confident in a social situation 
may be central for one to maintain self-integrity in some groups and cultures, thus 
making anxiety and being negatively evaluated in social situations a threat to one's self-
integrity. According to Sherman and Cohen (2006) people are particularly vigilant to 
situations or information which may threaten self-integrity and this vigilance extends to 
how others perceive this threat to the individual's self-integrity also. This suggests that 
self-integrity may be able to be threatened by the perception that others are making 
negative evaluations about a specific personal domain. 
According to SA theory, when self-integrity is threatened there are three ways 
that the individual can respond (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). They can accommodate the 
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threat by accepting their inability to meet a particular standard and use this as a basis for 
change. The likelihood of the individual accommodating the threat is largely dependent 
on how important the area of threat is to the person's self identity, as the more important 
it is, the less likely they will be willing to accept their failure in this area and change 
their attitude or behaviour. More frequently, people use defensive biases to deal with 
such threats to self integrity. Defensive biases are seen as psychological adaptations that 
allow a person to protect their self-integrity when it is threatened by decreasing the 
threat (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). Although these biases may be beneficial to the 
individual both psychologically and physically in the short term, in the long term they 
may impede the individual learning important information from their experiences or 
available information. For example, a socially anxious person who avoids stimuli linked 
to negative evaluation (a defensive bias) may experience a reduction in anxiety and 
protect self-integrity in the short term, but this behaviour may lead to their anxiety being 
maintained in the long term because they are unable to re-appraise the stimuli as being 
non-threatening. Defensive biases come in many forms, from dismissing information 
that is indicative of them acting unwisely to dis-identifying with areas of importance in 
which their skills are lacking in an attempt to protect their self-worth in case of failure. 
SA theory posits that there is a third way in which they person can respond and 
that is by compensating for failures by placing an emphasis on their successes in another 
domain (Sherman and Cohen, 2006). That is, an individual is assumed to be able to 
affirm alternative self resources unrelated to the threat at hand which reduces defensive 
bias because the individual then realises that their self-worth is not contingent upon the 
implications of the current threat. For example, a person who is reading a pamphlet 
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about the health risks of binge drinking and engages in this behaviour may be likely to 
dismiss the information, however if they are first affirmed in an unrelated domain (how 
they are valued as being an honest person for example), they are more likely to read the 
information in an unbiased fashion. This allows for the individual to both maintain their 
self-integrity and can lead to adaptive attitudinal or behaviour change. This effect is the 
basis of numerous SA studies that uses SA manipulation. SA manipulation has generally 
been done through activities that make the individual more aware or attentive to 
important values unrelated to the threat at hand or through the reflection of important 
parts of one's life unrelated the current threat (Klein & Harris, 2009). More recent 
manipulation tasks have involved the individual reflecting on how they would respond if 
their integrity was threatened (Armitage, Harris and Arden, 2011). 
Much of the research in this area has focused on how people respond to 
messages about health risks. According to the SA paradigm, the reason that this is 
threatening to self-integrity is because it suggests that the person has acted foolishly or 
that they are an unhealthy person (Sherman & Cohen, 2006). So for example, if a 
smoker reads about the risks of developing lung cancer from smoking, they are likely to 
act in a defensive manner and as such are unable to process the message in a way that 
may lead to behaviour change. However, research has indicated that if the person self-
affirms by focusing on resources in an unrelated domain (how they are a good parent for 
example), they may act less defensively and be able to process the information in an 
unbiased fashion. This effect has been exhibited in a large number of studies to date. For 
example, Harris and Napper (2005) investigated the role of SA manipulation on 
individuals reading a threatening health message linking breast cancer and alcohol 
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consumption. They found that individuals who had completed a SA manipulation task in 
which they were asked to select their most important value and write about how they use 
it in their daily life and why it was important to them prior to reading the threatening 
messages were more open to the information contained in the report. These individual's 
also exhibited more intention to decrease alcohol consumption than those who had not 
be self-affirmed prior to reading the message (who were more resistant and critical of 
the message). Importantly, this effect was only found for those to whom perceived their 
risk as being higher indicating that the threat must be personally relevant for SA 
manipulation to be effective in reducing defensive bias. The finding that SA activities 
can reduce a defensive bias to threatening health information and provoke intention to 
change has been replicated in a number of other studies focusing on a number of health 
risks including excessive caffeine consumption, smoking and unsafe sex (Harris, Mayle, 
Mabbott & Napper, 2007; Sherman, Nelson & Steele, 2000). 
Outside of research related to health risks, a study by Van Dijk, van 
Koningsbruggen, Ouwerkerk and Wesseling (2011) indicated that SA has particular 
implications in the interpersonal domain in terms of decreasing threat to the self in 
demonstrating that individuals with low self-esteem, when faced with a high-achiever, 
experienced less pleasure at the misfortune of the high achiever when given an 
opportunity to self-affirm themselves. This was explained as the high achiever evoking 
self-threat within the individual with low self-esteem and that an opportunity to self-
affirm decreases a defensive reaction to the self-threat. As such, experiencing pleasure at 
the misfortune of the high achiever acts as a defensive mechanism similar to an 
avoidance response in which the individual shifts attention from their own perceived 
weaknesses to someone else's. 
Self-Affirmation and Attention Bias 
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Few studies to date have looked directly at the processes involved in how SA 
reduces this defensive bias toward threatening information. Those that have, however 
indicate that a reduction in attention bias toward threatening information may be the key 
to the success of self-affirmation manipulation in its reduction of defensive biases. A 
study by Harris and Klein (2009), exposed female alcohol consumers to an article 
linking alcohol to breast cancer. Following this exposure, participants were either 
exposed to a SA condition or a control condition and then completed a dot probe task in 
which threatening words from the article were presented amongst a number of other 
threatening words and neutral words. This study found that amongst moderately heavy 
drinkers, individuals in the SA condition displayed an attention bias towards (as 
indicated by shorter latency times) the threatening words whereas those in the control 
condition exhibited the opposite effect ( an attention bias away from threatening words). 
This effect was also only found for the words presented within the article indicating that 
the effect was specific to fear congruent stimuli alone. 
This effect was supported by Van Koningsbruggen, Das and Roskos-Ewoldsen 
(2009) who found that coffee drinkers that had been self affirmed responded to threat 
related words taken from a health message on the effects of caffeine on health more 
quickly than those who had not been self affirmed. Those who had not been affirmed 
showed the opposite effect. Both of these studies suggest that self-affirming increases 
the accessibility of threat related cognitions by reducing a defensive bias and as such 
allows the individual to process the threat at hand. 
The Current Study 
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Despite the above studies indicating that SA appears to play a role in mitigating 
an attention bias toward personally relevant threatening information no studies have 
explored SA in a clinical population. This is surprising considering that it has been 
proposed that defensive processing of threatening information occurs in an attempt to 
decrease anxiety as well as protect positive views of the self (Schmeichel & Vohs, 2009) 
and a plethora of research suggests that anxiety interferes with an individual's ability to 
both understand and utilise information about health risks (Reed and Aspinwall, 1998). 
Despite anxiety being continually mentioned as playing a part in this process and 
previous SA studies indicating that SA manipulation is directly mitigating an attention 
bias toward threatening stimuli, no studies have specifically investigated the potential 
moderating effects of SA manipulation on anxiety and if it is able to decrease 
information processing biases in an individual that is experiencing a threat to the self. 
Therefore, the intention of the current study is to explore the possible moderating 
effects of SA manipulation on the attention bias exhibited in individuals with Social 
anxiety. Social anxiety has a particularly high relevance in relation to SA studies as it is 
often linked to negative self-perception, higher frequency of self-critical thoughts and 
negative self-appraisal, indicating that fear congruent threats may in fact present a threat 
to self-integrity. Furthermore, being socially anxious would likely present a threat to 
self-integrity as the ability to form relationships and be socially competent is important 
in most cultures. As such, the attention bias elicited by socially threatening information 
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acts as a defensive response in order to protect the individuals self-integrity as well as 
decrease state anxiety in response to threatening information. Based upon this, there is a 
possibility that SA manipulation will be able to produce a similar effect in reducing the 
attention bias in social anxiety when exposed to socially threatening information. 
As the population being studied are individuals who experience varying levels of 
social anxiety, this study will be delivered to participants fully through online 
administration. Research has indicated that individuals with social anxiety have a 
preference for online communication over face to face communication (Caplan, 2007) 
and it is hoped that this will attract individuals with social anxiety to the study. To date, 
it appears that this is the first study to do this in the investigation of the attention bias in 
social anxiety using the emotional Stroop task. It is unexpected that this mode of study 
delivery will affect the outcome of the study as previous researchers have successfully 
used computerised versions of the emotional Stroop task when looking at the attention 
bias in individual high in psychological distress (Kambouropoulos & Knowles, 2005). 
In fact it is expected that delivering the study through this modality will be an asset 
considering the population being studied and may provide access to a population that 
would not participate in studies requiring face to face contact. 
Summary and Aim of the Current Study 
In summary, research on the attention bias in social anxiety suggests that 
individuals high in social anxiety tend to exhibit a hypervigilance-avoidance response of 
words related to negative evaluation, self-schemata and self-evaluation. Previous 
research purports that self-affirmation may reduce an avoidant defensive bias toward 
personally relevant threatening information resulting in individuals responding more 
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quickly and openly to this information. No studies to date have explored whether SA 
manipulation is able to reduce the attention bias exhibited in individuals with high levels 
of social anxiety. In particular, this study is interested in the effect of SA manipulation 
on the attention bias in those with high social anxiety as this presents a particular threat 
to the person's self-integrity. As such, the aim of the current study is to explore the 
possible moderating effects of SA manipulation on the attention bias in individuals with 
high social anxiety. It will be guided by the hypothesis that individuals who are high in 
social anxiety and have been self-affirmed will respond more quickly to fear congruent 
threatening words presented in an emotional Stroop colour naming task than those who 
have not been self-affirmed. Those low in social anxiety are not expected to respond 
differently regardless of the experimental condition that they complete. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 150 individual's aged 18 to 71 years of age. The mean age of 
participants was 26.53 years (SD = 10.99). Undergraduate students were recruited 
through advertisements in first year psychology lectures, through the distribution of 
posters around the University of Tasmania campuses (see Appendix A) and through 
advertisements on the University of Tasmania website. Participants from the general 
community were also recruited through the distribution of posters around the University 
of Tasmania campuses and through advertisements placed in relevant online forums and 
at community venues. Participants were offered the chance to win one of three Coles-
Myer shopping vouchers or gain 90 minutes course credit (for University of Tasmania 
first year undergraduate students) for participating in the study. 
16 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants were invited to take part in an online study on Social Aspects of 
Thinking. Upon entering the webpage for this study, each participant was initially 
presented with an information sheet (Appendix B) and consent form (Appendix C) and 
were required to press 'continue' if they wished to participate in the study. 
Before answering any questionnaires, participants were required to enter a 
unique identifier consisting of the last 3 digits of their phone number and the first initial 
of their mother or father's name. This was done in order to allow participant's data to be 
matched up across the two parts of the study. Following this, participants answered a 
number of demographic questions and then completed questionnaires pertaining to 
depression and social anxiety. These questionnaires were made available through the use 
of Limesurvey(2012) software. 
At the completion of these tasks, participants were directed to access the second 
part of the study by clicking a URL address. There, they were randomly assigned to 
undergo either a self-affirmation (SA) manipulation condition or control condition 
before completing the outcome measure; an emotional Stroop task . Figure 1 shows the 
flow of participants throughout the study. These measures were made available through 
the use of lnquisit(2012) software. 
Following the completion of the outcome measure, participants were directed to 
a page with the contact information of phone, face to face and internet based services 
that were available to them if they wanted to discuss anything further or wished to seek 
help regarding mental health issues. Participants were also required to enter their email 
address if they wished to gain course credit or enter the draw to win an online shopping 
voucher. This study had full ethics approval from the Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Tasmania) network, reference number H0012796 (see Appendix D). 
Compl.eted both Predictor and 
Primary Outoome Measures 
n= 150 
All,ocated to SA mfillipulation 
n=79 
(n = 2J in high social anxiety 
group, 12 = 56 in low social 
anxiety group) 
Allocated t,_o do Emotional 
StroopTa!tl.:: 
n=79 
(12 = 23 in high social a11Xiety 
group,. n = 56 in lo\V social 
amiefy group) 
Randomisation 
Exd usions n= S 
_,!\,llocated to Control condition 
n=71 
(n = 25 in high social anxiety 
group, n = 46 in low social 
1111Xie ty group) 
Allocated to do Emotional 
Stroop Ta:sk 
n=ll 
(n = 25 in high social anxiety 
group, n = 46 in low social 
am ietygroup) 
• _l\.ccuracyon Stroop 3 
standard deviations 
belo,v mean accuracy 
Included in _!utalysi.s 
n=76 
(12 = 22 in high social auxiety 
group,. 12 = 54 in low social 
an.xietygroup) 
Figure I . Participant flow throughout study 
Primary Outcome 
Included in Analysis 
tF 66 -
(n = 24 in high social anxiety 
group, n = 42 in lo\v social 
anx ietygroup) 
Emotional Stroop task: In order to measure the impact of experimental 
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manipulation on attention bias in those both high and low in social anxiety, an emotional 
Stroop task was used. Administration and social threat words selected were negative 
social threat words that had previously been found to provoke an attention bias in 
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individuals with Social Phobia using the emotional Stroop task (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg 
and Dombeck, 1990) and high socially anxious individuals using a modified dot-probe 
task (Vassilopoulos, 2005). Words consisted of 10 threat words and 10 neutral words 
(see Appendix E) matched for letter and syllable length were presented in four colours 
(Red, blue, green, yellow). Each colour-word pair was displayed twice, resulting in a 
total of 160 trials for each participant. Order of words and colours were randomised for 
each participant and stimulus words were presented in the centre of a white screen in 
size 28 Arial font. Participants were required to press a letter (k=yellow, j=blue, 
f=green, d=red) to indicate the colour that the word was printed in and a reminder of 
these letters and their corresponding colours was presented constantly throughout the 
task at the top of the page (see Appendix F). Average response latency in milliseconds 
and the percentage of correct responses for the social threat and control words were 
recorded from this task. 
Gonsistent with previous studies in the area (Andersson et al., 2006; Lundh & 
Ost, 2001 ), an interference score was calculated to indicate any emotional interference 
caused by the social threat words. This was done by subtracting the mean latency time 
for the control words from the mean latency time for the social threat words for each 
participant 
Predictors 
Demographics. Participants were asked to answer questions pertaining to age, 
gender, relationship status, employment status and educational level by selecting the 
answer most relevant to them (Appendix G). 
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Social anxiety measure. The Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNES; 
Leary, 1983) is a 12 item measure of social anxiety that assesses an individual's fear of 
receiving negative evaluation from others. The perception that one is being negatively 
evaluated by others is a central characteristic of social anxiety and social phobia (Bogels 
& Mansell, 2004 ). 
The BFNES consists of 12 items and participants were required to answer each 
of the 12 statements ( e.g. 'I often worry that I will say or do the wrong things') by 
selecting a number on a scale of 1 (not characteristic of me) to 4 (extremely 
characteristic of me). In undergraduate samples, the BFNES has previously been 
reported to have good internal reliability with alpha's of 0.90-0.91 (Leary, 1983) and 
good test-retest reliability with correlations of .75 (Leary, 1983). Studies have also 
indicated that the BFNES has high convergent validity with a number of theoretically 
related measures (Rodebaugh et al., 2004) such as the Social Phobia Scale and the 
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (Mattick & Clarke , 1998). 
Based on previous literature suggesting that a subset of eight straightforwardly-
worded items of the BFNES (items 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 11 & 12; see Appendix G) are more 
reliable and valid at indicating fear of negative evaluation than the original 12 items in 
both clinical and undergraduate samples (Rodebaugh et al., 2004), the current study only 
included responses to the eight straightforwardly worded items in the final analysis. 
Further to this, a principle component analysis with a varimax rotation indicated two 
underlying factors for the 12 item BFNES(see Appendix H). The eight straightforward 
items loaded onto factor 1 which explained 55.23% of the variance in scores. The 
remaining four negatively worded items explained a further 15.38% of the variance in 
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scores. The finding that the 12 item BFNES comprises two underlying factors is 
consistent with previous research (Rodebaugh et al., 2004). The BFNES-
straightforwardly worded items have been found to have excellent internal consistency, 
with alphas of .92 and above and excellent construct validity in both undergraduate and 
clinical samples (Rodebaugh et al., 2004; Weeks et al., 2005). Consistent with previous 
research, a clinical cut-off score of 25 was used to distinguish individuals high and low 
in social anxiety (Carleton, Collimore, McCabe & Antony, 2011). 
Depression measure. The Beck Depression Inventory II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & 
Brown, 1996) is a 21 item self-report measure that measures both the presence and 
severity of depressive symptoms in the previous 2 weeks before testing, including the 
day of testing. Participants were required to rate themselves on a four point scale 
ranging from 0-3 on 21 depressive symptoms (e.g. loss of pleasure; sadness; pessimism) 
where higher scores reflect higher levels of depressive symptoms. Overall, the BDI-II is 
scored by summing the ratings for the 21 items. Scores of 0-13 indicate minimal 
depressive symptoms, 14-19 indicates mild depressive symptoms, 20-28 indicates 
moderate depressive symptoms, and scores of 29-63 indicates severe depressive 
symptoms (Beck, et al., 1996). The BDI-II has previously demonstrated good internal 
reliability in both undergraduate and wider samples (r=.92 and r=. 86, respectively; 
Segal, Frederick, Cahill & O'Riley, 2008) as well as good concurrent validity with a 
number of other depression measures (Storch, Roberti & Roth, 2004). Furthermore, 
computerised and pen and paper versions of the BDI-II have been found to be equivalent 
in measurement validity (Schulenberg & Yutrzenka, 2001). Previous studies indicate 
that comorbid depression and anxiety may obscure or account for some of the attention 
bias exhibited by individuals with social phobia (Musa, Lepine, Clark, Mansell & 
Ehlers, 2003. As such this will be controlled for in the current study by including 
participant's depression scores as a covariate in the final analysis. 
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Experimental intervention. Self Affirmation/ Control Task: SA was manipulated 
by having participants undergo a brief self-affirmation task developed by Armitage, 
Harris and Arden (2011 ). This task required participants to complete the stem "If I feel 
threatened or anxious then I will .... ". Participants were presented with four options in 
order to complete the stem; " ... think about the things I value about myself," 
" ... remember things that I have succeeded in," " ... think about what I stand/or," and 
" ... think about things that are important to me". Participants were asked to then type out 
their option in an open dialogue box (see Appendix I). 
The control task required participants to answer 10 questions unrelated to 
anything self-relevant (Reed and Aspinwall, 1998) such as "/ think the colour blue looks 
good on most people". Participants responded by selecting either a 'yes' or 'no' 
response. When participants responded 'yes' they were asked to elaborate upon their 
response in an open dialogue box (see Appendix J). 
A study by Armitage, Harris and Arden (2011) indicated that the brief SA 
manipulation used in this study is at least as effective at producing a self-affirming 
effect as other SA manipulations and is less reliant on verbal fluency that other self-
affirmation manipulation procedures. This study also indicated that the control task did 
not produce a self-affirming effect and as such is effective as a control task for the 
experimental condition. 
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Design and Data Analysis 
This study employed a 2 (Social anxiety: high, low) by 2 (Condition: SA, control 
condition) between subjects design. The dependent variable was the individual's social 
threat interference score, calculated by subtracting each participants mean latency time 
for control words from their mean latency time for social threat words. Interference 
scores were measured in milliseconds(ms). Positive scores were indicative of an 
emotional interference effect for social threat words and indicate that participants took 
longer to name the word colour for social threat words than control words. Depression 
was included as a covariate in the analysis based on previous research indicating that 
this may account for or obscure an attention bias. Data was analysed using a between-
subjects analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with significance levels being set at p<.05. 
To calculate effect sizes, partial eta squared was used. In order to check for any 
violations of AN COVA assumptions, tests of homogeneity of variance and normality 
were conducted, and the relevant non-parametric statistic was used in place of the 
original statistic in the case of a significant violation of either assumption. Independence 
of the covariate and treatment effect was tested by conducting a One-Way ANOVA with 
depression as the dependent variable. 
Univariate outlier trials (latency times of 3 standard deviations above or below 
each individual's mean social threat or control latency time for an individual trial) were 
removed from analysis. This resulted in 483 individual responses out of24,000 (2.01%) 
being removed before final analysis. 
Results 
Demographics 
The initial sample of the study comprised 150 participants. Participants were 
excluded from final analysis if they scored 3 standard deviations below their overall 
mean accuracy on social threat words and control words. This was done in order to 
include only participants that understood the instructions of the task and took the task 
seriously. On this basis, 8 participants were excluded from final analysis. 
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This left a sample of data from 142 participants (aged 18-71 years, M=26.66, 
SD=l0.94), 101 of which were female and 41 were male. Of the participants, 62.5% 
were aged 18 to 25 years, 31.9% were 25 to 50 years and the remaining 5.6% were over 
age 50. Of these participants, 17.4% reported being married, 4.9% dating, 13.2% in a 
defacto relationship, 31.3% reported being single and 29.9% selected 'other' as their 
relationship status. Furthermore, 11.8% of participants reported an educational level of 
Year 10 or below, 38.2% had achieved a year 12 education, 13.9% had completed a 
TAFE course, and 32.6% reported having completed an undergraduate or postgraduate 
university degree. The remaining 3.5% of participants selected 'other training 
certificates' as being their highest level of education. In terms of employment, 16. 7% of 
participants were employed full-time, 11.8% were employed part-time, 34% were 
employed casually and 32.6% were currently unemployed. 
In comparison to the general Australian population (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2012), the current study had comparable levels of people listing year 12 or 
below as their highest educational level. The levels of people reporting their highest 
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level of educational achievement as a training certificate of some kind is also 
comparable. However, the current study contained considerably higher levels of 
individuals that listed an undergraduate degree as their highest level of educational 
attainment. The unemployment rate of the study sample is also considerably higher than 
the Australian population, possibly due to the sample containing high numbers of 
university students, however the exact number of students participating was not 
measured. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Participants were distinguished as being either high (n=46) or low (n=96) in 
social anxiety based on a clinical cut-off score of 25 for the straightforward items of the 
BFNES (Carelton et al., 2011). Participants were randomly allocated to either the SA 
manipulation condition (n=76) or the control condition (n=66). Of the participants in the 
high social anxiety group, 22 completed the SA manipulation condition and 24 
underwent the control condition. In the low social anxiety group, 54 participants 
completed the SA manipulation condition and 42 underwent the control condition. 
The mean interference score for the low and high social anxiety groups (with standard 
deviations in parentheses) were 1.40 ms (SD= 114.37), and 16.40 ms (94.05) 
respectively. The mean interference score for the SA experimental condition group was 
8.76 ms (SD=l21.80) and for the control group was 3.38ms (SD=90.65). The mean 
interference score for the low social anxiety group in the SA and control experimental 
conditions were 1.27 ms (SD=126.47) and 1.60 ms (SD=98.15) respectively. For the 
high social anxiety group, participants scored a mean interference score of 27.14 ms 
(SD=l l 0.06) for the SA condition and mean of 6.55 ms (SD=77.69) for the control 
condition (See Figure 2; Appendix Kl). 
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Figure 2. Mean Interference scores of high and low social anxiety groups after SA 
manipulation or control conditions. 
Randomisation and Confounding Variables Checks 
Separate one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were run on the data to 
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examine if participants were evenly distributed between groups in the social anxiety and 
experimental groups in terms of age, relationship status, employment status and 
education level. These ANOV As revealed no significant differences between the high 
and low social anxiety group in terms of age, relationship status, employment status and 
educational status (p>.05; see Appendix K2). Separate one way ANOVAs also indicated 
that participants in the control and SA experimental groups also did not differ 
significantly on any of the aforementioned characteristics (p>.05; see Appendix K3). 
Testing ANCOV A assumptions 
26 
In order to assess whether variances between groups were equal, Levene' s test of 
homogeneity of variances was used. This test emerged non-significant, F=.291,p=.832, 
indicating that equality of variances can be assumed for the data. In order to investigate 
if the data was normally distributed within groups, skewness and kurtosis were analysed. 
These analyses indicated that the data slightly violates the assumption of normality with 
skewness of .748 (SE=.203) and kurtosis of 8.127 (SE=.404). However, due to between 
subjects ANCOVA calculations being robust against violations of normality, no 
transformations were made to the data. 
In order to test whether the assumption of independence of the covariate and 
treatment effect was met, a one way ANOVA with depression as the dependent variable 
was run (Appendix K4). This revealed that this assumption was not met as there were 
significant differences between the low and high social anxiety groups in depression 
scores F(l,138)=45.99,p<.001. The high social anxiety group reported significantly 
higher levels of depression when compared to the low social anxiety group. This is to be 
expected within the population being studied. No significant differences were found in 
depression scores between the SA manipulation condition and control condition 
F(l,138)=1.82,p>.05. Despite the assumption of the independence of the covariate and 
treatment effect being violated in relation to social anxiety group, no adjustments were 
made to the data because participants were then randomised to experimental groups and 
the primary hypothesis relates to the social anxiety group x experimental condition 
interaction. 
Between Subjects ANCOV A 
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Table 1 represents the estimated marginal means for interference scores for the 
high and low social anxiety groups, SA and control experimental groups and the social 
anxiety by experimental group interaction. A 2x2 between subjects ANCOVA [between 
subjects factors: social anxiety group (high, low) and experimental condition (self-
affirmation, control); covariate: depression], revealed that the social anxiety group by 
experimental manipulation condition interaction was not significant, F(l, 137) = .277, 
p>.05, 17/=.002, which indicates that the relationship between participants interference 
scores and social anxiety levels was not moderated by exposure to self-affirmation. 
Further to this, no main effects were found for social anxiety group, F(l, 137)=.366, 
p>.05, 11/=.003 or experimental condition, F (1,137)= .246,p>.05, 11/= .002, indicating 
there were no significant differences in interference scores depending on social anxiety 
level or experimental condition (Appendix K5). 
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Table 1. 
Estimated Interference Score Marginal Means for Social Anxiety Group, Experimental 
Group and Social Anxiety * Experimental Group Interaction. 
Social Anxiety 
Group 
High 
Low 
Total 
Experimental 
Condition 
Self-Affirmation 
Control 
Total 
Self-Affirmation 
Control 
Total 
Self-Affirmation 
Control 
Total 
M 
25.78 
5.62 
15.70 
1.71 
2.25 
1.98 
13.74 
3.93 
8.84 
Discussion 
SD 
15.15 
23.14 
17.84 
15.15 
17.46 
11.84 
14.16 
14.00 
10.02 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
-23.67-75.22 
-40.14- 51.38 
-19.57- 50.97 
-28.26-31.67 
-32.27-36.76 
-21.44-25.40 
-14.25-41. 74 
-23.76-31.63 
-10.975-28.65 
It has been consistently found that individuals with social anxiety exhibit an attentional 
bias toward socially threatening information, an information processing bias that plays a 
pivotal role in both the cause and maintenance of social anxiety symptoms (Bagels & 
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Mansell, 2004). Despite this well-evidenced finding, few studies have looked directly at 
how this attentional bias can be mitigated without the help of intensive therapeutic 
intervention. One area of research that has looked at reducing an attention bias ( often 
referred to as a defensive bias in this area) in relation to both health and cognitive 
related threats to the self is self-affirmation. Research in this area suggests that by 
focusing on a personal value or cherished aspect of oneself that is unrelated to the 
current threat is able to reduce a defensive bias toward personally-relevant threatening 
information. This study aimed to investigate if this is able to produce a similar effect in 
being able to decrease the attentional bias in a socially anxious population. . It was 
hypothesised that individuals high in social anxiety who have been self-affirmed would 
respond more quickly to fear-congruent threatening words (in this case socially 
evaluative words) presented in an emotional Stroop colour naming task than those who 
have not been self-affirmed. 
The results did not provide support for this hypothesis. That is, individuals who 
were high in social anxiety and were self- affirmed did not differ significantly from 
those who completed the control task. Furthermore, those high in social anxiety did not 
take longer to name the print colour of social threat words in comparison to those low in 
social anxiety as expected based on previous research. 
Main Effect of High versus Low social anxiety group 
As indicated in the results section, there were no significant differences in 
interference scores for individuals high in social anxiety when compared to those low in 
social anxiety. This effect was not expected taking into account previous literature 
indicating that individuals high in social anxiety take longer to respond to social threat 
words when compared with low socially anxious individuals (Mogg & Bradley, 2002; 
Vassilopoulos, 2005). 
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Despite this finding being inconsistent with much research on the attention bias 
in individuals high in social anxiety, it is consistent with previous studies that have 
indicated that when no social evaluative threat is present, there are no differences in 
attention between high and low socially anxious individuals. Mansell and colleagues 
(1999), conducted a study in which high and low socially anxious individuals underwent 
either a social evaluative threat condition (being told that they would have to make a 
public speech on a controversial topic) or a no evaluative threat condition prior to 
completing a modified dot probe task using faces. They found that an attentional bias for 
individuals high in social anxiety could be observed only under conditions of social-
evaluative threat. In the absence of social evaluative threat, individuals high and low in 
social anxiety did not differ in their attention to emotional faces. This suggests that 
socially anxious individuals only seem to display an attentional bias when other are 
present who can evaluate them or if they have an expectation that they will be evaluated 
by others. For the current study, this means that there is the possibility that by 
delivering the study online, the expectation of being negatively evaluated and the 
resulting anxiety could have been decreased in those high in social anxiety, leading to 
no differences in emotional interference when compared to the low social anxiety group. 
Consistent with this view is the finding that individuals high in social anxiety who 
exhibit an attentional bias toward social threat stimuli also exhibit higher levels of state 
anxiety at the time of the study (Vassilopoulos, 2005; Mansell et al., 1999; Mogg & 
Bradley, 2002). This indicates that higher levels of state anxiety may be necessary for an 
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attentional bias to be observed. As no measure of state anxiety was included in the 
current study, there is a possibility that those high in social anxiety did not experience 
enough threat in relation to the social threat words which may account for an attentional 
bias not being exhibited. 
Supporting this, a study looking at the effect of state versus trait anxiety on 
emotional interference in response to neutral, negative and positive words using the 
emotional Stroop task, (Dresler, Meriau, Heekeren and van der Meer, 2008) found that 
emotional interference was enhanced in participants high in state anxiety, but no 
influence of trait anxiety was found. They explained this as state anxiety exacerbating 
the interference toward emotional words because it is consistent with emotionally salient 
stimuli. This indicates that an individual's level of anxiety whilst doing a task may be 
more predictive of an individual engaging in information processing biases such as an 
attentional bias toward threatening information than any stable tendency to respond to 
certain threats with anxiety. In relation to the current study, this suggests that the online 
delivery of information and the absence of expectation of social evaluation 
accompanying this mode of delivery may have lead those high in social anxiety to 
experience low state anxiety and threat so that there was no attentional bias in 
processing the social threat words. 
An emerging area of research is currently exploring internet usage and social 
anxiety. From this, a number of studies have indicated that online communication might 
present a less threatening and anxiety provoking means of communication for 
individuals with social anxiety (Weidman et al., 2012; Caplan, 2007). Studies in this 
area have also indicated that there is a distinct connection between levels of social 
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anxiety and internet usage, in that people with higher levels of social anxiety have 
stronger preferences for online communication over face to face communication 
(Caplan, 2007), but the factors that lead to this have yet to be established. According to 
Lee & Stapinski (2012), individuals with social anxiety disorder are more comfortable 
using online forms of communication because face to face interactions lead to high 
levels of fear and anticipation of threat and negative evaluation. This view is also 
supported by Miller (as cited in Weidman et al., 2012, p.2) who also suggests that online 
communication decreases social evaluative fear, a key feature in the maintenance of 
social anxiety. A study by Weidman and colleagues (2012) suggests that individuals 
high in social anxiety feel more comfortable when communicating online and use the 
internet as a place to self-disclose more than in offline contexts, and that although such 
behaviour may be associated with poorer wellbeing, it presents a more comfortable 
environment for individuals high in social anxiety. This comfort and lack of social 
evaluative fear that individuals high in social anxiety report to experience indicates that 
delivering content online may be less anxiety provoking than a face to face delivery. As 
such, in the current study, delivering the content online may not have been provoking 
social evaluative threat, whereas previous studies that found an attention bias toward 
threatening words in individuals high in social anxiety have always employed face to 
face contact with an experimenter prior to completion of the task thus possibly 
provoking evaluative threat. Based upon this, there is a possibility that individuals high 
in social anxiety did not experience high enough levels of state anxiety in response to 
social threat words because of the chosen mode of delivery. 
33 
Main effect of Self-Affirmation 
As indicated, there was no main effect observed for the self-affirmation 
manipulation. This indicates that self-affirmed individuals did not differ significantly in 
interference scores from those in the control condition. 
It was not expected that there would be a main effect for self-affirmation on 
interference, as previous research suggests that self-affirmation is mainly effective in 
reducing an attention bias or defensive bias in individuals to whom the threatening 
message presented a personally relevant threat (Harris & Napper, 2005). As individuals 
were randomly allocated to the experimental conditions, individuals of differing social 
anxiety levels were distributed relatively evenly. As such, it was unlikely that there 
would be significant differences in interference scores based purely on experimental 
manipulation group in the present study. 
Social anxiety x Self-Affirmation Interaction 
It was expected that there would be an interaction effect between social anxiety 
group and self-affirmation; however the results of the study did not reflect this. This 
result is most likely due to the finding that individuals high in social anxiety did not 
differ significantly in interference scores from those with low social anxiety. As such, it 
was unable to be tested as to whether a SA manipulation condition was able to produce 
any reduction in interference scores for this group. This expectation was based upon 
previous research that indicated that self-affirmation in fact could reduce an attention 
bias toward personally relevant threatening information (Harris and Klein, 2009; Van 
Koningbruggen et al., 2009). However, as this study would have been the first to explore 
self-affirmation within the context of social anxiety, with previous research focussing 
predominately on non-clinical populations where the threats were either cognitive or 
health related, or challenges to one attitudes or values, it is difficult to speculate as to 
what would have been found had the primary outcome measure been effective. 
Limitations 
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Some methodological limitations warrant consideration. Firstly, as the task was 
administered online, a number of extraneous variables could have possibly influenced 
the task and could not be controlled for. As such, factors such as noise levels, 
interruptions, time of day administered and other environmental factors may have 
influenced the participant's responses on the tasks involved in the study, but were out of 
reach for the experimenter. Further to this, participation in the study required access to 
reliable internet and basic computer knowledge which might have excluded some 
participants or possibly lead to high anxiety states related to computer use. 
A second limitation may lie in the use of the Stroop task as a measure of 
attentional bias. Although used widely in the study of attentional bias in a number of 
populations, the emotional Stroop task has been criticised in its ability to identify what 
kind of attentional bias response an interference score is identifying, hypervigilance or 
avoidance, as both would lead to longer latency times (Bogels & Mansell, 2004). Others 
have questioned whether longer latency times are reflective of a selective attention bias 
toward the threatening words or rather indicate mental pre-occupation with themes 
related to the emotional words which in turn lead to longer latency times (Wells and 
Matthews, 1994 ). As such despite being utilised extensively as a measure of attentional 
bias, the emotional Stroop task may be an inexact measure of attention. 
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Furthermore, although the emotional Stroop task has been administered widely 
on a computer, only a few studies have implemented the Stroop task as an online study. 
This introduces a few factors which may have influenced participant's responses. 
Firstly, participants were not able to clarify instructions at any stage throughout the 
study. Secondly, as few studies have used online emotional Stroop task administration, 
research looking at the validation of this task when administered online is required. One 
study that did deliver the emotional stroop task online found that individuals high in 
psychological distress did exhibit an attentional bias toward emotional words when 
compared to those low in psychological distress (Kambouropoulos & Knowles, 2005). 
This study would suggest then, that the emotional Stroop task is able to detect 
attentional bias even when delivered online, however it is important to note that the 
population being studied is a distinctly different sample from the one in this study. 
Another limitation lies within the sample itself. As the sample was relatively 
restricted to University students and were primarily female, the results of this study may 
not be able to be generalised to the general population. 
Lastly, this study did not include a measure of state anxiety. Other studies 
looking at attention bias in social anxiety have found that individuals that are in the high 
social anxiety group score higher in a state and trait measure of anxiety as well as other 
measures of anxiety (Vassilopoulos, 2009; Mansell et al., 1999; Mogg & Bradley, 
2002). This study would have been strengthened by including a measure of state anxiety 
in order to identify levels of anxiety being experienced by the participants throughout 
the study. It could also have been improved by the inclusion of another measure of 
social anxiety. 
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Strengths and Implications for Future Directions 
Although the main hypothesis of this study was not supported, there were a 
number of promising findings that emerged from this study. Firstly, this was the first 
study to our knowledge to explore the attention bias exhibited in individuals high in 
social anxiety wholly through an online administration. Possibly because of this, this 
study was able to recruit a relatively high number of individuals that met a clinical cut 
off for social anxiety using the BFNES-straightforward items (32%). This indicates that 
online studies present a good medium through which to recruit and administer studies to 
individuals high in social anxiety. It also may provide the opportunity to access a 
population of individuals who would be unlikely to participate in face to face research 
and therefore potentially expands the scope of the research looking at the attention bias 
in individuals high in social anxiety. So, although the online administration of the study 
led to some possible methodological limitations, considering the population being 
studied, online administration of studies involving individuals with high social anxiety 
should be considered. 
The finding that no differences in attentional bias were found between those high 
and low in social anxiety in this study is certainly worthy of future research. This 
suggests that there may be a state anxiety component to this attentional bias which has 
not been explored directly in previous research. 
Clinical Implications 
This research has important implications for clinical settings. For one, the 
finding that no attention bias is present for individuals high in social anxiety in an online 
environment has a high importance in a practical setting, as it presents a means of 
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distributing information and therapy in a non-threatening setting. The absence of an 
attention bias also suggests that in an online setting, an individual high in social anxiety 
would be able to process this information in an objective, unbiased fashion thus making 
it a more effective line of treatment. This is particularly important considering that an 
estimated 80% of people with social anxiety disorder do not receive any type of 
treatment with fear of negative evaluation and social stigma listed as some of the 
reasons that this treatment is not sought (Yuen et al., 2013). In fact, research has 
indicated that online treatment programs for social anxiety have been effective (Yuen et 
al., 2013), however this is a relatively new area ofresearch. 
Despite being unable to test this in the current study, the ability of SA 
manipulation to reduce attention bias is certainly worthy of further investigation. As the 
attention bias in social anxiety plays a pivotal role in the maintenance of social anxiety, 
exploring ways in which the individual may be able to judge their surrounding in an 
unbiased way is paramount to understanding both the processes involved as well as 
possible ways to treat social anxiety. 
Summary and Conclusion 
Research has consistently found that individuals high in social anxiety show an 
attentional bias toward socially threatening stimuli, however few studies have 
investigated how this bias can be mitigated without therapy. In relation to health and 
cognitive threats, self-affirmation tasks in which the individual focuses on a personal 
value or important aspect of themselves has been found to be able to reduce an attention 
bias toward personally relevant threatening information. The current study aimed to 
explore if self-affirmation could decrease the attentional bias in high socially anxious 
individuals in a similar manner. 
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To our knowledge, this was the first study to explore self-affirmation in a clinical 
population. However, the findings from the present study could not examine mitigating 
effects of self-affirmation due to no differences in attentional bias being exhibited 
between high and low socially anxious individuals. Because of this, it is unable to be 
determined if self affirmation is able to decrease this attentional bias. 
This finding does, however have implications in relation to social anxiety and 
internet use. This was the first study to explore attentional bias in social anxiety wholly 
through online administration. The finding that the high socially anxious group showed 
no attentional bias suggests that the content was not threatening enough for the 
individual, potentially because it was delivered online. We purport that this may have 
occurred due to the individuals experiencing less anxiety because their fear of being 
negatively evaluated was not as high as would occur when participating in studies 
requiring face to face contact. 
In summary, although present findings were unable to explore the hypothesis 
initially proposed, the results of this study nevertheless are promising as they suggest an 
area in which the attention bias in social anxiety may not be exhibited, namely an online 
setting. This could have important implications in a practical setting in terms of 
delivering effective online treatment for this particular population. Further to this, this 
finding suggests that there may be a state anxiety component to this attentional bias that 
is certainly worthy of future research. 
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Appendix A 
Information Poster 
School of Psychology 
We are seeking participants who are aged 18 years + to participate 
in a study about how various levels of feeling anxious in social 
situations relate to thinking about people. 
90 minutes course credit available 
OR 
The chance to win one of three $50 online shopping 
vouchers 
All you have to do is visit 
https://surveys.psychol.utas.edu.au/index.php?sid=95372&lang=e 
n to participate! 
For more information about this study please contact Samantha McCarthy 
by email: sm03@utas.edu.au 
This study is being conducted through the School of Psychology as partial 
fulfilment of a Masters degree and is being supervised by Dr. Jenn Scott 
and Dr. Ben Schuz. 
Please take one of the slips below and go to {URL} to participate! 
Appendix B 
Participant Information Sheet 
Social Anxiety and Self-Affirmation 
Information form for participants: 
1. Invitation 
You are invited to participate in a research study investigating thinking in social 
situations. This study is being conducted in partial fulfilment of a Masters degree for 
Miss Samantha McCarthy under the supervision of Dr. Jenn Scott and Dr. Ben Shuz. 
2. What is the purpose of this study? 
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The purpose of this study is to investigate how various levels of feeling anxious in social 
situations relate to thinking about people. Your participation in this research will help 
the researchers to better understand the processes involved in how we respond to social 
situations. 
3. Why have I been invited to participate? 
This study is open to everyone over the age of 18 years who is willing to complete a 
number of measures relating to how different levels of anxiety relate to thinking about 
people. 
You are under no obligation to participate in this study. If required, you may print a 
copy of this information sheet and discuss your decision to consent with others before 
consenting to participate in this study. It is important that you understand that your 
involvement in this study is voluntary. While we would be pleased to have you 
participate, we respect your right to decline. There will be no consequences for you if 
you decide not to participate in the study. 
4. What will I be asked to do? 
If you do choose to participate you will be asked to consent to participate and spend 
approximately 90 minutes completing a number of online questionnaires and response 
time measures relating to how various levels of feeling anxious in social situations relate 
to thinking about people. You are able to complete these measures on a computer of 
your choice at a time convenient for you. 
5. Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
Personal benefits from this study may come in the form of gaining knowledge about 
psychological studies and the procedures implemented in psychology research. It is also 
possible that you may experience more positive feelings or mood states following 
research participation. We will be interested to see if you experience any other benefits 
from the research. 
If you are a first year psychology student at UTAS, you are also able to receive 
90 minutes of course credit for participating. For those not receiving course credit, there 
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is a chance for you to enter a draw to win one of three online shopping vouchers as a 
thank you for your participation. 
The findings from this study may help gain more information about the role of 
anxiety in social situations and build upon previous research in this area. It is hoped that 
this study may lead to uncovering processes that alleviate negative social thought 
patterns. 
6. Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
It is not expected that you will become distressed in relation to any of the content in this 
study. However, if you find that you are becoming distressed or experience any mood 
changes during or following participation in this study please feel free to contact the 
University Psychology Clinic on 6226 2806 for counseling services at no expense to 
you. A number of helplines such as Lifeline (13 11 14) and Beyond Blue (1300 22 
4636) are also available to you if you experience any adverse effects from this research. 
7. What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
If you wish to withdraw from this study at any time during your participation, you are 
able to do so without any consequences or explanation and this data will not be used in 
the research. However, once you have completed all measures, individual data is unable 
to be withdrawn as it is collected anonymously and as such is unable to be separated 
from other participant's data. 
8. What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
All research data arising from this study will be kept on a password protected secured 
server for five years after the first publication of this research at which time it will be 
deleted. All data is completely confidential and will only be accessed by the researchers 
conducting the study. 
9. How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be available on the University of Tasmania website 
(www.utas.edu.au) and will also be published as a Master thesis. Participants will not be 
identifiable in the publication of results in any of these formats. 
10. What if I have questions about this study? 
If you would like to discuss any aspect of this study please feel free to contact either Dr 
Jenn Scott (email: jenn.scoWciutas.edu.au; phone: 6226 2245), Ben Schuz (email: 
Benjamin.Schuez@utas.edu.au; phone: (03) 62 267 471) or Miss Samantha McCarthy 
(email: sm03@utas.edu.au). We would be happy to discuss any aspect of the research 
with you. Once we have analysed the information we will be happy to email you a 
summary of our findings if you wish. You are welcome to contact us at that time to 
discuss any issue relating to the research study. 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Science Human Research 
Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the conduct of this study 
you should contact the Executive Officer of the HREC (Tasmania) Network on (03) 
6226 7479 or email human.ethics,c1 utas.cdu.au. The Executive Officer is the person 
nominated to receive complaints from research participants. You will need to quote 
H12796. 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this study. 
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If you would like a copy of this consent form, feel free to print a copy or contact the 
researchers of the study. 
To take part in the study please press continue. By pressing continue, this will 
direct you to a consent form for this study. 
52 
Appendix C 
Participant Consent Form 
Social Aspects of Thinking 
Consent Form for Participants: 
1. I agree to take part in the research study named above. 
2. I have read and understood the Information Sheet for this study. 
3. The nature and possible effects of the study have been explained to me. 
4. I understand that the study will take up to 90 minutes to complete and involves 
answering a number of online questionnaires and response time measures 
pertaining to how different levels of feeling anxious in social situations relate to 
thinking about people. 
5. I understand that participation should not be emotionally distressing. However, if 
at any point I feel uncomfortable with any of the materials or procedures, I am 
able to withdraw without question and be directed to psychological services to 
use if necessary. 
6. I understand that all research data will be securely stored on a password 
protected server for five years from the publication of the study results, at which 
time it will be deleted. 
7. Any questions that I have asked have been answered to my satisfaction. 
8. I understand that the researchers will maintain confidentiality and that any 
information I supply to the researchers will be used only for the purposes of the 
research. 
9. I understand that the results of the study will be published so that I cannot be 
identified as a participant. 
10. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any 
time without any effect. 
11. I understand that I will not be able to withdraw my data after completing the 
study as data has been collected anonymously. 
Thank you for considering taking part in this study. 
If you would like a copy of this consent form, feel free to print a copy or contact the 
researchers of the study. 
To take part in the study please press continue. By pressing continue, this will 
indicate that you have given your informed consent to participate in this study. 
Appendix D 
Ethics Approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) 
Network 
Social Science Ethics Officer 
Private Bag 01 Hobart 
Tasmania 7001 Australia 
Tel: (03) 6226 2763 
Fax (03) 6226 7148 
Katherine.Shaw@utas.edu.au 
HUMAN RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (TASMANIA) NETWORK 
3 December 2012 
Dr Jenn Scott 
School of Psychology 
Private Bag 30 
Student Researcher: Samantha McCarthy 
Sent via email 
Dear Dr Scott 
Re: MINIMAL RISK ETHICS APPLICATION APPROVAL 
Ethics Ref: H0012796 - Social Anxiety and Self-Affirmation 
~ 
UTAS 
We are pleased to advise that acting on a mandate from the Tasmania Social Sciences 
HREC, the Chair of the committee considered and approved the above project on 22 
October 2012. 
This approval constitutes ethical clearance by the Tasmania Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee. The decision and authority to commence the associated 
research may be dependent on factors beyond the remit of the ethics review process For 
example, your research may need ethics clearance from other organisations or review by 
your research governance coordinator or Head of Department. It is your responsibility to 
find out if the approval of other bodies or authorities is required. It is recommended that the 
proposed research should not commence until you have satisfied these requirements. 
Please note that this approval is for four years and is conditional upon receipt of an annual 
Progress Report. Ethics approval for this project will lapse if a Progress Report is not 
submitted 
The following conditions apply to this approval. Failure to abide by these conditions may 
result in suspension or discontinuation of approval 
It is the responsibility of the Chief Investigator to ensure that all investigators are aware 
of the terms of approval, to ensure the project is conducted as approved by the Ethics 
Committee, and to notify the Committee if any investigators are added to, or cease 
involvement with. the project. 
A PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF HEAL TH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
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2. Complaints: If any complaints are received or ethical issues arise during the course of
the project, investigators should advise the Executive Officer of the Ethics Committee 
on 03 6226 7479 or human.eth1cs@utas.edu.au.
3. Incidents or adverse effects: Investigators should notify the Ethics Committee
immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or unforeseen
events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project
4. Amendments to Project: Modifications to the project must not proceed until approval is 
obtained from the Ethics Committee. Please submit an Amendment Form (available on
our website) to notify the Ethics Committee of the proposed modifications.
5. Annual Report: Continued approval for this project is dependent on the submission of a
Progress Report by the anniversary date of your approval. You will be sent a courtesy
reminder closer to this date. Failure to submit a Progress Report will mean that
ethics approval for this project will lapse.
6. Final Report A Final Report and a copy of any published material arising from the
project, either in full or abstract, must be provided at the end of the project.
Yours sincerely 
Katherine Shaw 
Ethics Officer 
Tasmania Social Sciences HREC 
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Appendix E 
Social threat and Neutral Words 
Social Threat Words Neutral Words 
Embarrassed Specialised 
Stupid Insert 
Coward Network 
Inferior Obsidian 
Boring Metric 
Foolish Portion 
Vulnerable Narratives 
Worthless Softened 
Inadequate Imperative 
Ridiculed Democrat 
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Appendix F 
Example of Emotional Stroop Task Pages 
coward 
foolish 
Appendix G 
Demographic questions 
•How old are you? 
Answer 
•Please select your gender 
r 
• Female 
r 
• Male 
*What is your current relationship status? 
Choose one of the following answers 
r 
• Married 
r 
• Engaged 
r 
• Defacto 
r 
• Dating 
r 
• Single 
r 
• Other: 
•What is your highest educational level to date? 
Choose one of the following answers 
r 
• Less than year 10 
r 
• Year 10 
r 
• Year12 
r 
• Undergraduate University Degree 
r 
• Postgraduate University Degree 
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r 
• TAFE certificate 
r 
• Other training certificate 
r 
• Other: 
*What is your current employment status? 
Choose one of the following answers 
r 
• Employed Full-time 
r 
• Employed Part-time 
r 
• Employed Casually 
r 
• Unemployed 
r 
• Other: 
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AppendixH 
Factor Analysis for Exploratory Analysis with Varimax Rotation of Brief Fear of 
Negative Evaluation Scale 
Item Component 1 Component 2 
BFNES 6 - I am afraid that people will find fault .892 -.094 
with me 
.886 -.120 
BFNES 5- I am afraid that others will not approve 
ofme 
.851 -.104 
BFNES 3- I am frequently afraid of other people 
noticing my shortcomings 
.850 -.217 
BFNES 9- I am usually worried about what kind of 
impression I make 
BFNES 8- When I am talking to someone, I worry .849 -.130 
about what they may be thinking about me 
BFNES 12- I often worry that I will say or do the .848 -.175 
wrong things 
BFNES 11- Sometimes I think I am too concerned .802 -.276 
with what other people think of me 
BFNES 1- I worry about what other people will .777 -.360 
think of me even when I know it doesn't make any 
difference 
BFNES 7- Other people's opinions of me do not -.258 .764 
bother me (R) 
BFNES 2- I am unconcerned even if I know .066 .762 
people are forming an unfavourable impression of 
me (R) 
BFNES 10- If I know someone is judging me, it -.189 .760 
has little effect on me (R) 
BFNES 4- I rarely worry about what kind of -.288 .703 
impression I am making on someone 
Appendix I 
Self-Affirmation Manipulation 
Tht followmg q1.1ctwon loo~s at how ::,e,:>plt respond 10 cctrt.a«1 
s.~uaoons Pleas<e take ,·our 11me aoo ch<xlse tile item that tloest 
rf~Cl$ wtiat ,s. mos, trw o• you 
PJck OM of the four options below that II most true of you in 
ri,lation to thlP following qwsoon: If I fffl ttH'HltmlPd or 
anxious ti-.n I will ... 
1),..lhinll about thlP things I valw abovl myMlr. 
3J ... thank about what I stand for. 
41 ... thlnk .about thing, that art important to me. 
Type the opbon that you r.electtd (starting with ·1r1 in the ~xt 
box below 
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Appendix J 
Example of Control Condition Pages 
Inc following. quc:,,!lon" an: dc:,,ignl·d to rnca:.urc 
pt·r,,,nnal opini\,ns fhc:,,c questions refer to YOl 'R 
vpinions on earh topic. I11crc an: no right or wmng 
answer,,,, s.o please~ as honest as po:,.sihk If you 
an:,.wcr YFS to any ,lfthe qwl-ti,,1t:,., )OU will~ 
a~kcd to pro\'1dt• a n.-a:,.on for" hy you hd11."\ c thi,. 
~tah:m~·nt 
I think the colour blue looks great on most 
peopU!. 
Yes No 
! --1 
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If you answered 'Yes', then please wrtte 
one to two sentences to explain your 
answer. If you answered no, then please 
continue to the next question 
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Appendix K 
Statistical Analyses Reported in Results Section 
Kl. Descriptive Statistics 
Social Anxiety Experimental M SD 
Group Condition 
High SA 27.1411 110.05930 
Control 6.5459 77.69212 
Total 16.3958 94.05344 
Low SA 1.2697 126.47398 
Control 1.5670 98.14896 
Total 1.3997 114.37401 
Total SA 8.7588 121.79804 
Control 3.3775 90.65319 
Total 6.2576 108.10424 
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N 
22 
24 
46 
54 
42 
96 
76 
66 
142 
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K.2. Separate One Way ANOVA's comparing high and low social anxiety groups 
on factors of Age, Educational Level, Relationship Status and Employment Status. 
Sum of df Mean F Sig. 
Squares Square 
Age Between 39.093 1 39.093 .320 .572 
Groups 
Education level Between .998 1 .998 .589 .444 
Groups 
Relationship Status Between 1.988 1 1.988 .965 .328 
Groups 
Employment Between .003 1 .003 .003 .958 
Status Groups 
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K3. Separate One Way ANOVA's comparing Self-Affirmation manipulation and 
control groups on factors of Age, Educational Level, Relationship Status and 
Employment status. 
Sum of df Mean F Sig .. 
Squares Square 
Age Between .011 1 .011 .000 .992 
Groups 
Education level Between .001 1 .001 .001 .977 
Groups 
Relationship Status Between .005 1 .005 .002 .962 
Groups 
Employment Status Between .210 1 .210 .176 .676 
Groups 
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K4. Independence of covariate and treatment effect 
Source Type III SS df Mean F Sig. 
Square 
Corrected Model 3965.804a 3 1321.935 15.597 .000 
Intercept 22931.871 1 22931.871 270.558 .000 
Social Anxiety 3897.914 1 3897.914 45.989 .000 
Group 
Experimental 154.503 1 154.503 1.823 .179 
condition 
Social anxiety 13.219 1 13.219 .156 .694 
group * Condition 
Error 11696.562 138 84.758 
Total 35068.000 142 
Corrected Total 15662.366 141 
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KS. 2 x 2 between subjects ANCOV A 
Source Type III SS df Mean F Sig. Partial n2 
Square 
Corrected Model 12132.642a 4 3033.160 .254 .907 .007 
Intercept 2085.394 1 2085.394 .175 .677 .001 
Depression Score 268.396 1 268.396 .022 .881 .000 
Social Anxiety 4365.146 1 4365.146 .366 .546 .003 
Group 
Experimental 2935.075 1 2935.075 .246 .621 .002 
condition 
Social anxiety 3304.577 1 3304.577 .277 .600 .002 
group * Condition 
Error 1635667.497 137 11939.17 
Total 1653360.535 14 
2 
Corrected Total 1647800.13 141 
